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INTRODUCTION
In a recent decision concerning a bullying boss and sexual
harassment claims, the Ninth Circuit looked beyond whether the
defendant boss treated men and women differently. In analyzing the
claims, the court considered whether each sex reacted differently
to the workplace abuse.1 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit created a
"Subjective Effects Test,"2 stating that whether men and women react
differently is indicative of differential impact and thus differential
treatment.' The Ninth Circuit saw this as a reasonable extension
of the Reasonable Woman analysis, which asks what a Reasonable
Woman would consider offensive and hostile.4 The Reasonable Woman
standard, however, is traditionally reserved for cases of harassment
of a sexually explicit nature, not cases of differential treatment.5 The
Ninth Circuit's new application of this doctrine to disparate treatment
claims is a significant departure from well-settled precedent. Further-
more, considering a gender's reaction to a given situation in an effort
to determine disparate treatment not only misinterprets the Reason-
able Woman standard but also erroneously applies the same standard
to differential treatment claims. Such application is problematic be-
cause differential treatment claims are generally not based upon sex-
ually explicit conduct.
This subjective effects test poses a number of troubling impli-
cations for Title VII claims. First, by expanding sexual harassment
doctrine to target bullies who abuse male and female employees
alike, the Ninth Circuit contravenes existing discrimination doctrine
and offends the stated purpose of Title VII.6 As federal courts have
stressed, "it is for Congress to decide whether to address bad work-
place behavior that cannot be labeled discriminatory. It is not the
province of federal courts to expand the language of a statute that
is clearly limited. Title VII covers only sex discrimination."7 Second,
1. E.E.O.C. v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2005).
2. Id. at 845-46. "We now hold that evidence of differences in subjective effects...
is relevant to determining whether or not men and women were treated differently, even
where the conduct is not facially sex or gender-specific." Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Differential treatment, also called disparate treatment, refers to discrimination
in which one gender is treated differently, based purely on gender difference. Differential
treatment generally does not include conduct that is sexually explicit in nature. See Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
6. Congress enacted Title VII "to provide injunctive relief against discrimination...."
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Civil Rights Act of 1964].
7. Holman v. Indiana, 24 F.Supp.2d 909, 915 (N.D.Ind. 1998); see also Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 89 (U.S. 1998).
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employing a subjective effects test results in a move away from
developing principles of equality and empowerment, and instead re-
inforces negative stereotypes of women as emotional, unstable, and
unable to deal with workplace stress. Third, expansion of Title VII in
this direction - to cover more of the ever-increasing claims of harass-
ment - ignores the larger problem of general workplace harassment,
leaving those claimants who are not members of a protected class
without recourse.
This note evaluates the Ninth Circuit's addition of a subjective
effects test to the standard analysis used by courts in disparate treat-
ment claims. Part I reviews the progression of sexual harassment doc-
trine and its various claims, with particular emphasis on disparate
treatment and the development of the Reasonable Woman standard.
As discussed in Part II, the Ninth Circuit's use of an unprecedented
subjective effects test in disparate treatment actions threatens to
muddy the waters of sexual harassment doctrine by misapplying the
Reasonable Woman standard. This expansion of sexual harassment
doctrine ignores the larger problem of general workplace harass-
ment, as further detailed in Part III. Part IV explores the scope and
reality of workplace harassment and analyzes whether a separate
cause of action under employment law might provide a more appro-
priate remedy.
I. TITLE VII AND TYPES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in an effort to
combat discriminatory practices at work throughout the country. 9
Title VII of the Act specifically provides a remedy to members of pro-
tected groups who have been subjected to discriminatory practices
in the workplace.1" Prior to the ratification of this legislation, victims
of sexual harassment could only find recourse by seeking legal remedy
based on common-law tort claims.11 In 1980, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) created guidelines to process com-
plaints filed under Title VII, officially putting the sexual harassment
cause of action into effect.' 2 These guidelines define sexual harassment
8. See GARY H. NAMIE, WORKPLACE BULLYING INSTITUTE, THE WBI 2003 REPORT ON
ABUSIVE WORKPLACES 4 (2003), http://www.bullyinginstitute.org/res/2OO3results.pdf
[hereinafter WBI REPORT].
9. Civil Rights Act of 1964.
10. Id.
11. Elizabeth Jubin Fujiwara & Joyce M. Brown, Cause of Action for Post-Ellerth/
Faragher Title VII Employment Sexual Harassment Claims, in 27 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D
1, 42-43 (2005).
12. Id. at 38-40.
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as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" that occur when:
(1) submission to such conduct is... a term or condition of an
individual's employment,
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is
used as the basis for employment decisions .... or
(3) such conduct [unreasonably interferes] with an individual's
work performance or creat[es] an intimidating, hostile, or offen-
sive working environment.
13
In addition to setting forth a definition for sexual harassment,
the EEOC went on to delineate how allegations of sexual harassment
should be evaluated:
(b) In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual
harassment, the Commission will look at ... the nature of the
sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents
occurred. The determination of the legality of a particular action
will be made from the facts, on a case by case basis. 4
Soon after the EEOC set forth these standards, courts began to
use them as the standard tool of analysis in deciding sexual harass-
ment claims.'5
A. Dichotomy of Sexual Harassment Claims: Quid Pro Quo and
Hostile Environment
While the EEOC guidelines16 set forth three separate instances
in which employer conduct constitutes sexual harassment, courts have
typically dichotomized claims of sexual harassment into two separate
camps: (1) "quid pro quo," which encompasses claims falling within
the first two instances defined by the EEOC, and (2) "hostile environ-
ment" for the third. 7 Although each cause of action contains different
elements of proof, sexual harassment claims frequently include alle-
gations of both "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" harassment.8
13. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2006).
14. Id.
15. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,65 (1986); see also Henson v. Dundee,
682 F.2d 902, 904 (1982).
16. Codified as 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2006).
17. The Supreme Court first drew this distinction in the case of Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson. 477 U.S. at 65.
18. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment Claims, 73 B.U.
L. REv. 1, 11, 14 (1993) (citing Alba Conte, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law and
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Nevertheless, courts throughout the nation have consistently relied
on this distinction between quid pro quo claims and hostile environ-
ment claims in deciding cases, and they employ different analyses for
each claim.19
Quid pro quo claims are generally easier to prove; they rely
heavily on whether the plaintiff can prove that she was denied a tan-
gible employment benefit due to the fact that she refused to succumb
to sexual advances or other sexually explicit harassment.20 Hostile
work environment claims, on the other hand, have a more in-depth
analysis and require that certain malleable standards be met.21 First,
the plaintiff must prove that she is a member of a protected class, as
defined by Title VIL22 Second, she must prove that she was "subjected
to unwelcomed [sic] sexual harassment in the form of sexual ad-
vances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature. ' 23 Third, the harassment must have been "based
upon sex" and must have "had the effect of unreasonably interfering
with the plaintiffs work performance, and creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment that affected seriously the
psychological well-being of the plaintiff."24 Finally, the plaintiff must
prove employer liability25 under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
As quid pro quo and hostile environment claims contain different
elements, each requires the court to use a different analysis.27 The
United States Supreme Court established separate tests for each
claim in its 1998 decisions of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth21
and Faragher v. Boca Raton,29 in an effort to fashion clear rules for de-
termining employer liability in such claims.30 For quid pro quo sexual
harassment claims, the Court held that an employer is vicariously
liable for unlawful sexual harassment by a supervisor that culmi-
nates in a tangible employment action taken against the victim. To
succeed, the plaintiff must establish a nexus between the harassment
Practice §2.2, 150-57 (1990)).
19. Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 11, at 38.
20. George, supra note 18, at 14.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619-20 (6th Cir. 1986)
(listing elements of a sexual harassment claim and finding that the plaintiff failed to sus-
tain her burden of proving that she was a victim of Title VII sexual harassment)).
24. Id.
25. Title VII applies to all companies, both public and private, that have at least fifteen
employees. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e (b) (2000).
26. George, supra note 18, at 14.
27. Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 11, at 58.
28. 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998).
29. 524 U.S. 775, 785 (1998).
30. Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 11, at 34, 58-59.
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and the denial of some tangible employment benefit.31 In cases of
hostile environment claims, the Court held that the plaintiff must
prove that the harassment was so "severe or pervasive" as to create
a hostile work environment.32 In practice, this is typically a more
onerous burden for the plaintiff to meet. Courts have uniformly used
these tests to analyze sexual harassment stemming from lewd and
lascivious employer actions, establishing consistent precedent.33
B. Sexual Harassment Distinguished From Gender-Based
Harassment and Disparate Treatment
As sexual harassment law has progressed, the doctrine has ex-
panded to include discrimination that is not sexually explicit but is
nevertheless based on sex.34 This gender-based type of sexual ha-
rassment claim, known as disparate treatment, is distinguishable
from the original sexual harassment claims that grew out of sexually
explicit harassment. Thus, sexual harassment can best be understood
by looking at sexual harassment in terms of two types of claims: 1)
sexually explicit sexual harassment,35 which includes quid pro quo
and hostile environment claims, and 2) gender-based sexual harass-
ment, known as disparate treatment.36
Sexually explicit sexual harassment has long been recognized by
the justice system, conforming to the definition of sexual harassment
set forth by the Civil Rights Act of 1964Y.3 Instead, disparate treat-
ment harassment does not require that the employer engage in "[u]n-
welcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature."3 Disparate treatment sexual
harassment refers to instances in which one gender receives unequal
treatment based on gender.39 Disparate treatment sexual harass-
ment need not be sexual in nature. It requires no mention of gender
or sex, nor does it require the harasser to engage in lewd or lascivious
31. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 753-54. 'When a plaintiff proves that a tangible employ-
ment action resulted from a refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she
establishes that the employment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and
conditions of employment that is actionable under Title VII." Id.
32. Id. at 754; see also Rogers v. E.E.O.C., 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) ("One can
readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to de-
stroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers.").
33. Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 11, at 47-50.
34. Id. at 76.
35. For the remainder of this note, the term sexual harassment refers to this type of
claim.
36. Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 11, at 72.
37. See id. at 42-43.
38. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2 (Interpretive Notes and Decisions).
39. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998).
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affronts to the victim.4" Disparate treatment sexual harassment refers
to incidents in which one gender is treated differently, based purely
on gender.4' While this differential treatment may be sexually explicit
in nature, it need not be.42 For instance, a supervisor who calls female
subordinates by sexually explicit nicknames but does not engage in
similar mistreatment of male subordinates, would be committing dis-
parate treatment sexual harassment that is also sexually explicit.43
On the other hand, a supervisor who calls only female subordinates
by rude titles, or insults that are not sexually explicit, commits dis-
parate treatment sexual harassment because he is not affording fe-
male employees the same respect he affords male employees.44
Courts have found that even when a work environment is gen-
erally hostile for all employees, plaintiffs may be able to distinguish
their cases and bring suits for discrimination by showing a differ-
ence in the instances or severity of abuse as proof of disparate treat-
ment. Federal laws have been revised to reflect courts' recognition of
the disparate impact cause of action.45
C. Codification of the Disparate Impact Cause of Action
In 1991, Congress made several changes to the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991.46 Among other
things, the new Act added a section to the statute, defining disparate
impact sexual harassment and delineating the requirements for legal
action brought on this basis.4 v While courts had been grappling with
disparate treatment for years, this Act marks the first time that legis-
lation formally recognized the principle of disparate treatment.48
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 addresses disparate impact by
stating:
(k) (1) (A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate
impact is established under this title only if -
40. See id.
41. E.E.O.C. v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2005).
42. Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 11, at 39.
43. See Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (discuss-
ing supervisor who referred to female employee as "dumb fucking broad").
44. Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 266-69 (1993) (discussing super-
visor swore at female employees and used vulgar names).
45. Raley v. Bd. of St. Mary's County Comm'rs., 752 F.Supp. 1272, 1280 (D. Md.
1990); Laughinghouse v. Risser, 754 F.Supp. 836, 840 (D. Kan. 1990).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
48. Steven R. Greenberger, A Productivity Approach to Disparate Impact and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 72 OR. L. REV. 253, 256-57 (1993).
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(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent
uses a particular employment practice that causes a
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin and the respondent fails to demon-
strate that the challenged practice is job related... ; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration...
with respect to an alternative employment practice and
the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative em-
ployment practice.49
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 largely in response
to five 1988 employment discrimination cases that garnered much
media attention and greatly limited the reach of federal laws protect-
ing workers.5 ° In addition to providing protection to victims of dispa-
rate treatment abuse, the 1991 Act also allows for greater damages,
including punitive fines.51 Although this Act uses the term "disparate
impact," it may be more appropriate to refer to this cause of action as
"disparate treatment" in light of the corresponding analysis and focus
on employer conduct: the primary inquiry to determine "disparate im-
pact" sexual harassment is whether an employer subjected members
of only one sex to adverse terms or conditions of employment.52
According to George Rutherglen, author of Employment Dis-
crimination Law: Visions of Equality in Theory and Doctrine,53 "the
difference between these types of claims is significant, so much that
constitutional law only recognizes claims of disparate treatment, not
disparate impact."' While Rutherglen acknowledges that these claims
are similar, he explains that claims of disparate treatment generally
refer to intentional discrimination, while disparate impact relies on
a showing of discriminatory impact, with no intention requirement.55
This is an important distinction in terms of the factual and legal anal-
ysis taken by the court in addressing claims of disparate treatment.
The development of the disparate treatment sexual harassment
action has clearly advanced the concept of equality in the workplace
49. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000).
50. Greenberger, supra note 48. See generally Lorance v. AT & T Techs, Inc., 490 U.S.
900 (1989); Martin v. Wilkes, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio 490
U.S. 642 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 reversed all five of these
cases.
51. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000).
52. Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 269 (1993) (citing Harris v.
Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993)).
53. GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw: VISIONS OF EQUALITY
IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 74 (2003).
54. Id.
55. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 53, at 77.
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and has been an imperative expansion of sexual harassment doctrine.
Recognition of this type of claim, and the corresponding legal condem-
nation of differential treatment based on gender, has significantly
leveled the playing field within the American workplace.56 Title VII
has appropriately served as the weapon of choice for many victims
fighting gender-based sexual harassment. The disparate treatment
harassment claim facilitated many sexual harassment actions that
would have otherwise gone unpunished and unrecognized by the jus-
tice system." Without this claim of action, courts would be forced to
deny justice to many and reflect approval of - or at least acquies-
cence to - sexist work environments. With this development of law,
female plaintiffs have made great strides toward achieving equal pay,
equal advancement opportunities, and equal roles in the workplace.
This result was precisely the intended effect of Title VII, which states:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."
D. Sexual Harassment and the Objective Reasonable
Woman/Person Standard
Before 1991, the standard for determining whether harassment
was so severe or pervasive as to create a hostile environment was
whether a reasonable person would find it to be so.59 Courts estab-
lished this standard to ensure that mild teasing and minor, unre-
peated incidents did not rise to the level of actionable harassment. °
The Ninth Circuit re-evaluated the reasonable person standard in
Ellison v. Brady, in which the court reasoned that a "Reasonable
56. Id.
57. Indeed, this was the very premise and policy behind the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1991) (reasoning that "we [the
court]... prefer to analyze harassment from the victim's perspective" where a supervisor
sent disturbing love letters to plaintiff).
60. Id.; see Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 11, at 82.
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Woman" standard constitutes a more accurate measure of the abuse
in cases concerning a female victim.6
The Reasonable Woman standard evolved as an element used
in evaluating sexual harassment claims, applied by courts in cases
involving explicitly sexual harassment, aimed toward women." In
Ellison v. Brady, the Ninth Circuit explained its invocation of the
Reasonable Woman standard:
[W]e believe that many women share common concerns which
men do not necessarily share. For example ... women who are
victims of mild forms of sexual harassment may understandably
worry whether a harasser's conduct is merely a prelude to violent
sexual assault. Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault,
may [lack a] a full appreciation of the social setting or the under-
lying threat of violence that a woman may perceive.... We adopt
the perspective of a reasonable woman primarily because we be-
lieve that a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be
male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the experiences
of women.6"
In this context, the Ninth Circuit made an important distinction
by acknowledging that women have a different perspective on sexu-
ally explicit behavior.' Women, conscientious of the fact that they are
far more likely to be victims of sexual assault than men," are also
more likely to view a man's unwelcome advances as potentially dan-
gerous.' The Reasonable Woman standard is thus based on the need
for sexually explicit harassment to be viewed from the woman's per-
spective to fully appreciate its significance.67
Other courts have followed the Ninth Circuit's lead in implement-
ing the Reasonable Woman standard. The Eighth Circuit utilized
the Reasonable Woman standard in the case of Burns v. McGregor
Electronic Industries, Inc., in which a federal judge was instructed to
compensate a plaintiff terrorized by a supervisor who continuously
subjected her to rude and sexual comments and requested that she
61. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879-80.
62. Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 11, at 81-83.
63. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879-80.
64. E.E.O.C. v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 845-46 (9th Cir. 2005).
65. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); National Center for Injury
Prevention and Control, Sexual Violence: Fact Sheet http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/factsheets/
svfacts.htm. "Women are more likely to be victims of sexual violence than men: 78% of
the victims of rape and sexual assault are women and 22% are men[.]" Id. (citing NANCY
THOENNES & PATRICIA TJADEN, NAT'L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, REPORT NCJ 183781, FULL
REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY (2000)).
66. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
67. Id.
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watch pornographic movies with him.6" The court held that such
behavior would have a more harmful impact on women than men.69
Following this line of reasoning, other courts continue to apply a
Reasonable Person standard, some articulating that the measure of
impact be from a similarly situated person's perspective to encom-
pass the intentional focus on gendered perspective.7"
While courts do not always agree on whether to apply a reason-
able woman standard to interpret hostile work environment claims,
they do agree on one thing: the Reasonable Woman standard should
be left to those cases involving sexually explicit discrimination cases.
This sentiment is manifest in the noticeable and reasonable absences
of the Reasonable Woman standard from disparate treatment juris-
prudence. In its recent decision of EEOC v. NEA-Alaska,71 the Ninth
Circuit departed from this well-established precedent by invoking
the Reasonable Woman standard in a case lacking sexually explicit
conduct." The Ninth Circuit currently stands alone in this, its newest
endeavor to expand the reach of Title VII.
II. EEOC v. NEA-ALASKA
The case of EEOC v. NEA-Alaska presents an unprecedented
expansion of the analysis used in disparate treatment cases of sexual
harassment and application of the Reasonable Woman standard. In
this case, the Ninth Circuit found an abusive boss to be guilty of dis-
parate treatment sexual harassment.73 In addition to the traditional
test of looking to the harasser's behavior toward different sexes, the
Ninth Circuit found the severity of victims' reactions to be indicative
of whether they were treated differently within the meaning of Title
VII.74 The court reasoned that although the offending supervisor,
Thomas Harvey, was hostile toward both men and women in the
workplace, women experienced more harassment than their male
counterparts and they could therefore claim sexual harassment for
their abuse.75 A closer look at this case suggests that the court used
an improper method to reach a just result.
68. Burns v. McGregor Electronic Indust., Inc., 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993).
69. Id. at 965.
70. Jayne L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and the
Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMoRY L.J. 151, 162-68 (1994).
71. Id.
72. E.E.O.C. v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2005).
73. Id. at 847.
74. Id. at 843-46.
75. Id.
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A. Employees Bring Title VII Claim to Punish Bullying Boss
The facts of the case are heated and poignant. Fed up with the
yelling, screaming, and threatening behavior of their supervisor, sev-
eral female subordinates, along with the EEOC, brought legal action
against National Education Association of Alaska (N.E.A.-Alaska),
alleging that their supervisor's misconduct was sexually motivated.76
Harvey, the offending boss, had a bully's reputation and was known
for habitually terrorizing subordinates and instilling fear in those
who crossed his path.7" While Harvey's mistreatment never included
sexual innuendo or references to sexuality, the female plaintiffs raised
a claim of disparate treatment, alleging that Harvey mistreated them
because they were women.7" Yet the record shows that Harvey en-
gaged in similar behavior toward male subordinates: shouting, pump-
ing his fists, and spitting in the faces of both male and female em-
ployees on a regular basis.79 The women claimed that they were more
injured by Harvey's actions and therefore should have standing to
bring claims of sexual harassment.' In its decision, the Ninth Circuit
court agreed, reasoning that the women manifested more severe
reactions to Harvey's abuse than the similarly situated men, citing
this as proof that the women were more affected by the abuse.81
A closer look at this case suggests that the Ninth Circuit used an
unwarranted analysis to get to the right conclusion. In its decision, the
court went beyond the traditional test of looking to the harasser's be-
havior toward different sexes; it made an additional finding that the
severity of the plaintiffs reactions are indicative as to whether they
are victims of sex-based discrimination within the meaning of Title
VII. 2 The case of EEOC v. NEA-Alaska presents an unprecedented
expansion of the analysis used in disparate treatment cases of sexual
harassment and application of the Reasonable Woman standard.
B. The Ninth Circuit's Creation of a Subjective Effects Test
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the case in such a way as to charac-
terize the supervisor's harassment toward women as "different" and
76. Id. Carol Christopher, Julie Bhend, and Carmela Chamara filed charges against
NEA-Alaska with the EEOC in April of 2000. The EEOC filed the initial suit in July of
2001. Id. at 842.
77. Id. at 843-44.
78. E.E.O.C. v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2005).
79. Id. at 843.
80. Id. at 845.
81. Id. at 846.
82. Id.
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"worse" and thus actionable under Title VII.83 The record suggested
more incidents of mistreatment of female subordinates than males,
although the defense points out that women made up the majority of
the office staff.8 4 Furthermore, the defense pointed out that the men
were frequently out of the office, leaving the women a captive audi-
ence for Harvey. 5 The court concluded that, even adjusting for these
disparities, Harvey abused female employees more frequently than
male employees.86 Such characterization of differential treatment as
sexual harassment is widely accepted under Title VII and well sup-
ported by precedent.8
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit opted not to stop at this quan-
titative examination but buttressed its finding with a determination
that the women were more injured than male employees by similar
mistreatment.8 In reaching this conclusion, the court fashioned a
new rule: 'We now hold that the evidence of differences in subjective
effects.., is relevant to determining whether or not men and women
were treated differently, even where the conduct is not facially sex-
or gender-specific., 89 To satisfy its rule, the court cited the women's
apparent heightened sensitivity to Harvey's mistreatment as evidence
of disparate treatment.90
In determining whether Harvey harassed female subordinates
more than male subordinates, the court reasoned that Harvey's abuse
"affected women more adversely than it affected men."'" To make its
point, the Ninth Circuit went on to say that "there is no evidence in
the record that any male employee manifested anywhere near the
same severity of reactions (e.g., crying, feeling panicked and physi-
cally threatened, avoiding contact with Harvey, avoiding submitting
overtime hours for fear of angering Harvey, calling the police, and
ultimately resigning) to Harvey's conduct as many of the female em-
ployees have reported."92 Based in part on this subjective analysis, the
court determined that Title VII provided a viable cause of action for
the women in this suit.93 This secondary justification for finding
disparate treatment, based upon comparing manifest reactions of
83. Id. at 845-46.
84. E.E.O.C. v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2005).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 846-47.
87. Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 11.
88. E.E.O.C. v. N.E.A., 422 F.3d at 845-47.
89. Id. at 845-46.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 834.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 847.
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victims, transforms the analysis from differential treatment to one
of differential response.
In an attempt to approve the claim of action, the court confused
disparate treatment with differential experience of similar treatment.
Disparate treatment is traditionally measured by the difference in
treatment of different groups, such as men and women, not the dif-
ference of apparent impact such behavior has on different groups.94
By measuring disparate treatment through the reactions of those
victimized, the Ninth Circuit injects a subjective effects test into an
otherwise objective analysis. Such use of a subjective effects test in
a disparate treatment case is not only unprecedented but arguably
unsound.
In its analysis of this disparate treatment action, the Ninth
Circuit went beyond the cited precedent of Oncale,5 the landmark
case providing Title VII protection against sexual harassment based
on disparate treatment. While Oncale recognized "direct compara-
tive evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of
both sexes" as evidence of disparate treatment,96 the Ninth Circuit
mischaracterized this finding as "whether [the harasser's] behavior
affected women more adversely than it affected men."97 Oncale cre-
ated an objective analysis of differential treatment, considering only
whether the harasser's treatment of men and women was objectively
different.9" Implicit in this analysis is a determination based on the
objective quality and quantity of the harasser's behavior; the court
in Oncale gave no weight to the subjective effect of mistreatment on
victims of different sexes. 99 Differential treatment has never before
been evaluated on the same plane as differential experience of simi-
lar treatment. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit espouses differential
reactions of victims as a central component of its finding in EEOC
v. NEA-Alaska.o
1. The Ninth Circuit's Misapplication of the Reasonable
Woman Standard
In justifying this expansion, the Ninth Circuit points to the
Reasonable Woman standard, a measure traditionally used by courts
to determine what a "reasonable woman" would consider offensive or
94. Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 11.
95. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (U.S. 1998).
96. Id.
97. E.E.O.C. v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2005).
98. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
99. Id.
100. E.E.O.C. v. N.E.A., 422 F.3d at 846.
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hostile.'' The Reasonable Woman standard is used to evaluate cer-
tain situations in which the same behavior toward males and females
may constitute sexual harassment against one sex.' °2 In such cases,
courts use the Reasonable Woman standard to measure whether a
"reasonable woman" would have considered the alleged misconduct
against the female plaintiff to be "intimidating, hostile or offensive."'0 3
Courts have traditionally reserved the Reasonable Woman standard
for only those cases involving sexually explicit sexual harassment
stemming from derogatory language, comments about a specific sex,
or sexually explicit behavior that may be considered harassment of
the targeted sex, but not necessarily harassment of the other sex.0 4
A closer examination of the Reasonable Woman standard and its
proper application reveals that it is not applicable to cases of dis-
parate treatment and was improperly invoked by the Ninth Circuit
in EEOC v. NEA-Alaska.
2. Why Disparate Treatment Claims Do Not Invoke the
Reasonable Woman Standard
Courts have stopped short of applying this gender-specific stan-
dard to evaluate abuse lacking a sexual nature. Instead, they use a
different analysis for claims of disparate treatment. A review of the
sexual harassment cause of action, along with the proper use of the
Reasonable Woman standard, indicates that the courts have not used
the subjective effects test to determine differential treatment where
the alleged harassment is not facially sex-specific, and for good reason.
In disparate treatment actions, a court's determination of
whether mistreatment qualifies as sexual harassment traditionally
rests on whether victims were singled out because of their gender.'o5
Disparate treatment is therefore determined by an examination of
"direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated
members of both sexes,"16 ultimately asking whether "members of
one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of em-
ployment to which members of the other sex are not exposed."10 7 To
determine whether the harassment was actually attributable to dis-
crimination, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may point to
sexually explicit and deprecating language from the harasser or,
101. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, 78 n.2e (8th ed., Aspen
Publishers 2004).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Fujiwara & Brown, supra note 11, at 39.
105. Bolden v. PRC, Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir. 1994).
106. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998).
107. Id. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993)).
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alternatively, may "offer direct comparative evidence about how the
alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex work-
place."' 8 This analysis relies on an evaluation of the defendant's con-
duct toward similarly situated men and women, using an objective
analysis of that behavior to reach a conclusion.'0 9
Ignoring this precedent, the Ninth Circuit proclaimed that "evi-
dence of differences in subjective effects.., is relevant to determining
whether or not men and women were treated differently, even where
the conduct is not facially sex- or gender-specific." ''1 Cases cited by
the court concerning the Reasonable Woman standard addressed only
harassment claims based on sexually explicit misconduct.1 While
the Ninth Circuit stated conclusively that the Reasonable Woman
standard is applicable to disparate treatment claims of sexual harass-
ment, the court neither cited any authority for this application nor
offered any justification for this expansion based on law or policy.' 2
The Ninth Circuit's modification of the Reasonable Woman stan-
dard in EEOC v. NEA-Alaska to include a subjective effects test'1 3
fails to follow the precedent of disparate treatment analysis or pre-
cedent of the Reasonable Woman standard. Furthermore, the court's
application of the Reasonable Woman standard to a disparate treat-
ment case" 4 threatens to fundamentally change the test of differen-
tial treatment: it would no longer be based on the objective amount
and quality of the harasser's conduct but on a subjective evaluation
of the victim's reaction.
Preceding cases have uniformly demonstrated that the test for
determining whether one gender has received differential treatment
is whether the harasser's treatment of men and women was objec-
tively different. The victim's reaction to the harasser's behavior is
generally not considered in determining whether the harasser dis-
criminated against a protected class. By adopting this new test, the
Ninth Circuit shifts the focus from the harasser's behavior to the
victim's response.'15
Invoking the Reasonable Woman standard for behavior that
lacks sexual conduct leaves one wondering why the Ninth Circuit
opted not to use a reasonable person standard. Gender-specific differ-
ences in visible reactions to hostility cannot support an argument
that women were, in fact, more victimized by the harassment than
108. Id. at 80-81.
109. Id. at 81.
110. E.E.O.C. v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2005).
111. Id. at 845.
112. See generally id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 846.
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their male counterparts.'16 To require as much not only perpetuates
the female stereotype of women as the weaker sex but also leaves
men without recourse for similar harassment. The opinion of the
Ninth Circuit in EEOC v. NEA-Alaska threatens to contravene ex-
isting principles of sexual harassment law and policy. This use of the
Reasonable Woman standard and creation of a subjective effects test
should therefore be carefully analyzed before it is accepted as a suit-
able development of this doctrine.
C. Misapplication of the Reasonable Woman Standard
The Reasonable Woman standard does not fit with disparate
treatment jurisprudence. The Reasonable Woman standard was not
created to determine whether female claimants were treated dif-
ferently because of their gender"7 but only to determine whether
their perception of certain behavior as "harassment" was accurate,
as viewed from the female perspective.' In EEOC v. NEA-Alaska,
the Ninth Circuit used the Reasonable Woman standard to distin-
guish female reactions from the reactions of male counterparts in an
effort to show disparate treatment." 9 This subjective effects test is a
deviation from the Ninth Circuit's previously stated purpose for the
Reasonable Woman standard.2 °
In Ellison v. Brady, the Ninth Circuit found that the Reasonable
Woman standard should be used to determine whether conduct is
perceived as offensive and hostile by considering how a reasonable
victim of the same sex would view the conduct.' 2 ' The court reasoned
that "conduct that many men consider unobjectionable may offend
many women."'22 This rationale of Ellison fails in NEA-Alaska when
used to determine whether men and women were treated differ-
ently.'23 In NEA-Alaska, male workers testified that they too found
116. E.E.O.C. v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2005).
117. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 (stating that the adoption of a reasonable woman
standard did not equal greater protection for women).
118. See, e.g., Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology
of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1207-08 (1990) (listing
examples where men trivialize and downplay harassment whereas women view the con-
duct in a much more serious light).
119. E.E.O.C. v. NEA, 422 F.3d at 846.
120. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting the court adopts
a reasonable woman standard to overcome the male-based, sex-blind reasonable person
standard that "tends to systematically ignore the experiences of women.").
121. Id. at 880.
122. Id. at 878.
123. E.E.O.C. v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840,846 (9th Cir. 2005).(finding that
Harvey raised his voice to both men and women and engaged in altercations with men).
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Harvey's behavior objectionable. 24 Thus, while a court may appro-
priately use the Reasonable Woman standard to determine whether
misconduct rises to the level of harassment,"' it should not be used
to determine whether women were treated differently.'26 To find other-
wise would be to perpetuate outdated, negative stereotypes of women
in the workplace.
1. The Reasonable Woman Standard Ignores Different
Reactions of Men and Women When Applied to Disparate
Treatment Claims
Even if one chooses to ignore the basic differences in how men
and women display their reactions to stress, the court's attempt to
justify a test based on the "differences in subjective effects"'27 while
looking to whether "any male employee manifested anywhere near
the same severity of reactions"'28 is fundamentally flawed.'29 This
approach ignores basic cultural and biological differences in how men
and women display their reactions to stress.
Americans live in a culture that embraces women as emotionally
expressive and champions men as strong and steadfast in the face of
hardship. 3 Women and men learn to exhibit different responses to
stimuli, and it follows that the disparity often seen in male and fe-
male reactions does not necessarily correlate to the true subjective ef-
fect of harassment experienced by men and women."'3 An unadjusted,
124. Id. at 846.
125. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879-80 (adopting the Reasonable Woman standard to
better determine how an objective person of the same sex would view a situation more
effectively neutralizes gender differences on harassment to place both genders on equal
footing in the work place).
126. See JEFFREYA. KOTTLER, THE LANGUAGE OF TEARS 126 (1996) (noting that when
males and females are faced with similar emotions they react differently based on gender).
127. Id. at 845-46.
128. Id.
129. See Shelley E. Taylor et al., Biobehavioral Responses to Stress in Females Tend-
and-Befriend, not Fight-or-Flight, 107 PYSCHOL. R. 411, 421-22 (2000) (research indicated
women are more likely to care for offspring and join social groups to combat stress while
the fight-or-flight syndrome is a response activated in part by testosterone, the predomi-
nant male hormone).
130. KOTTLER, supra note 126, at 156-57 (discussing how women and girls are en-
couraged to cry in response to sadness and as a means of expression while men and boys
are told not to cry, mope, or act like a girl).
131. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that men and women
view rape and sexual assault differently with the former assessing it in a vacuum, whereas
the latter are most often victims); Angelo Soares, Tears at Work: Gender, Interaction, and
Emotional Labour, 2 JUST LABOuR 36, 38-39 (Spring 2003) (indicating that women tend
to cry more than men for a variety of reasons such as biology, hormones, and socializing
rules that do not necessarily indicate that men and women view conduct differently); Lorna
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side-by-side comparison of male and female reactions to identical
behavior is often not indicative of male/female perceptions. As one
expert notes, "[w]omen may cry more often on the outside but we all
feel like crying about the same number of times. It is gender training
that molds us to express ourselves in particular ways." '132
In terms of socially acceptable behavior in today's workplace,
women tend to be more expressive and demonstrative. 13 3 Men, how-
ever, tend to internalize stress and refrain from emotional displays.3
A reasonable woman may thus perceive a female worker's tears as
evidence that she felt more victimized than a male counterpart who
makes no comparable emotional display.1 35 A reasonable man may,
however, find that male subordinates who refrained from emotionally
reacting nevertheless "perceived [the environment] as hostile or abu-
sive. ' 36 This difference demonstrates that an unadjusted comparison
of male and female reactions to identical behavior may not accurately
reflect male/female perceptions. While women may manifest more
severe reactions, both women and men may perceive the environment
as equally hostile or abusive.
Research and reports in the fields of medicine, psychology, busi-
ness, and law recognize that men and women react differently to
workplace stress. 37 According to such authority, women tend to have
more visible reactions to stress; they tend to cry more than men, to
appear visibly shaken, and to manifest visible reactions in general,
more so than men. 138 On the other hand, research indicates that men
tend to suppress reactions to stress, manifesting more subtle reac-
tions to stressful situations.3 9 "Suppressing feelings and internaliz-
ing stress are learned, male traits," says Glenn E. Good, Associate
Professor of Education and Counseling Psychology at the University
of Missouri, Columbia. 4 ° Dr. Good maintains that these learned traits
Collier, When a Good Cry Just Doesn't Work, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 6, 2004, at 24 (ex-
plaining that women cry more frequently than men when faced with stress at work and
fear being viewed as weak).
132. See KOrLER, supra note 126, at 125-26.
133. See generally id. at 122 (noting that women are more likely to cry both in frequency
and duration than men); id. at 135 (noting women are forced to abandon emotions and
reactions to gain respect in a working world dominated by men).
134. Cathy Lu, Male-Specific Problems When Dealing with Workplace Stress, WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/content/article/l1/1685-50102.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
135. See KOTLER, supra note 126, at 125-26.
136. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
137. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Soares, supra note 131 (indi-
cating that women cry more than men and explaining the role of tears in the workplace);
Collier, supra note 131.
138. Id.
139. Lu, supra note 134.
140. Id.
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prevent men from speaking up about workplace stress.'41 He com-
ments: "On some inner level, it comes down to: If I can't tough it out,
then I'm not much of a man."'42
Research indicates that men and women manifest different vis-
ible reactions to stress,' men being more prone to stifle visible signs
of stress'4 and women tending to react to stress in more visible
ways.'45 According to psychological reports, women are more prone
to crying and tend to do so more often than men. 14 Dr. William H.
Frey II, Professor of Pharmaceutics in the neurology department at
the University of Minnesota, 147 reports that women cry four times
more often than men. 14 Furthermore, he states that while six per-
cent of women do not cry at all, fifty percent of men never cry. 49 Both
sociology and biology are cited as the responsible sources for this gen-
dered difference. 5 ° Professor Frey cites "culture and socialisation [as
playing] a crucial role in the determination of who cries and why."''
Men and women are socialized to react differently to the onset of
emotions.' 2 Society teaches men that they should not cry; boys often
hear the term "big boys don't cry" and are scorned or teased when
they do.'53 Girls are more likely to be comforted when they cry, and
they experience tears as a normal reaction to emotional upset.' This
disparity continues into adulthood, and men and women often cry for
141. Id.; see also TOM LUTz, CRYING: THE NATURAL & CULTURAL HISTORY OF TEARS
180-81 (1999). During the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, new ideas regarding masculinity emerged, especially in the business world. Spe-
cifically, men were encouraged to stifle emotional expression and maintain the appearance
of composure to maximize productivity. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Taylor et al., supra note 129, at 421-22.
144. Lu, supra note 134.
145. See generally KOTTLER, supra note 126, at 122.
146. Soares, supra note 131, at 39 (citing A. Vingerhoets & J. Schiers, Sex Differences
in Crying: Empirical Findings and Possible Explanations, in GENDER AND EMOTION:
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 143 (Agneta H. Fischer ed., 2002)).
147. Collier, supra note 131.
148. Id. (reporting that women, on average, cry about 5.3 times in a month, while men
only cry about 1.4 times a month).
149. Id.
150. See Soares, supra note 131, at 39.
151. Id.; see also Ko'rrLER, supra note 126, at 7 ("There is a syntax and grammar to the
language of tears, a set of cultural, gender, familial, genetic, and interactional rules for
when and where this behavior is permitted."); Collier, supra note 131 (reporting that Tom
Lutz, author of Crying: A Natural and Cultural History of Tears, points to social condi-
tioning in explaining why women cry more frequently: "Since women are conditioned to
be more subservient than men, they are 'allowed' to cry more often").
152. Soares, supra note 131, at 38.
153. Id.; Collier supra note 131; KOTrLER, supra note 126, at 17 ("For many people,
especially those of the male persuasion, crying ... was teased out of us by our parents
and peers when we were much younger.").
154. KOTTLER, supra note 126, at 157.
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different reasons. 5 Women are more likely to cry when they ex-
perience anger, and most often when they experience anger that is
brought on by humiliation, unfair treatment, or personal misunder-
standings.156 A qualitative study focusing on gender, tears, and the
workplace, found that infliction of different types of violence at work
triggered tears.157 Not surprisingly, the study found bullying to be
"the most insidious form of violence at work."'58 The severe anxiety
experienced was the result of repeated intentional abuse, designed to
anger and weaken the target. 15 9
Some experts point to the large role biology plays when explain-
ing why women cry more than men. Dr. Frey points out that women's
tear ducts are anatomically different from men's.'" ° Differences in the
construction of tear ducts make it more likely for tears to spill out of
a woman's eyes and roll down her cheeks, and more likely for tears
to drain through the tear ducts of men, never making an appearance
on the face.' 6' Women are therefore more likely to engage in visible
crying than men.
Regardless of whether biology or sociology is responsible for
the more frequent tear-shed seen in women, this emotional reaction
should not be viewed as an indication of greater emotional distress.
Instead it should be acknowledged as one type of reaction to stress-
ful stimuli, but not necessarily indicative of more severe emotional
trauma. Crying, while often a symptom of stress, cannot be relied
upon as an accurate indicator of the severity of stress experienced.
Dr. Jeffrey A. Kottler is one of the foremost authorities on human
relationships and interaction. 162 In his book, The Language of Tears,
Kottler makes an important distinction between the impact felt by
individuals faced with stress and the manifest reactions to that emo-
tional distress. '63 To demonstrate the point, Kottler poses a hypo-
thetical of two people who have both just received news that they
have been denied an important business partnership that would
155. Collier, supra note 131 (noting that Tom Lutz attributes crying by men primarily
to pride).
156. Soares, supra note 131, at 39 (citing J. M. PLAS & K. V. HOOVER-DEMPSEY,
WORKING UP A STORM: ANGER, ANXIETY, JOY AND TEARS ON THE JOB (1998)).157. Id. at 42 (citing D. G. Williams & G. M. Morris, Crying, Weeping, or Tearfulness
in British and Israeli Adults, 87 BRITISH J. PSYCHOL. 479-505 (1996)).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Collier, supra note 131.
161. Id.
162. Dr. Kottler is currently the Professor and Chair of the Department of Counseling
at California State University. For a biography and links to related works, visit http://
www.jeffreykottler.com/linksbio.html.
163. See KO rLER, supra note 126, at 7-8 (noting the need to cry occurs when an indi-
vidual reaches a breaking point, but that this point can vary by person).
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have resulted in financial stability, a promotion at work, and an op-
portunity to partner with a motivating, encouraging friend and part-
ner.16 Kottler notes that both individuals would experience the same
emotional impact upon hearing this news: "If there was a way to mea-
sure the physiological arousal going on in their endocrine systems,
the hypothalamic and cortical regions of their brains, their sympa-
thetic nervous systems, and their corresponding internal reactions,
you would find virtually identical levels of stimulation."'65 Both
would have substantially increased heart rates, breathing patterns,
and blood pressure. 166 Both would be experiencing emotional upset,
mentally straining in an effort to understand what went wrong. 167
Despite these similarities, Kottler points out that "you would be
puzzled at how each of them is revealing so differently the overflow
of emotion that is going on inside of them."'68 He goes on to explain
that one is crying audibly and visibly, her emotional despair evident
by the tears on her face.' 69 The other sheds no tears or cries, but in-
stead scowls and remains reserved. 7 0 Although these individuals are
experiencing the same emotional impact from the distress they expe-
rienced, according to Kottler their learned behaviors and unique in-
dividual traits dictate how they will react. 171 Kottler's hypothetical
demonstrates how outward appearances can be deceptive and inaccu-
rate measures of actual experience. The biological and cultural differ-
ences in male/female reactions will largely dictate how an individual
outwardly reacts to internal turmoil.
In EEOC v. NEA-Alaska, the court took note of the different
reactions of men and women. 172 Yet instead of recognizing basic differ-
ences in male/female behavior, the court used this distinction as evi-
dence of disparate treatment, even though the record indicated that
male subordinates received their share of bullying. 173 To the point,
the court emphasized the tears and avoidance behavior of women
while downplaying the emotional turmoil of men. One male victim-
ized by Harvey's mistreatment, Jeff Cloutier, offered testimony about
164. Id. at 8.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 8-9.
168. Id. at 9.
169. Id.
170. id.
171. Id.
172. E.E.O.C. v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting
that the women froze when subjected to Harvey's harassment, broke down in tears, and
generally tried to avoid him while the men "talk[ed] it out" with Harvey and "rolled with
the punches" because it was part of "being with the boys").
173. Id. at 846.
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a stressful encounter that "scared the hell out of him. 174 He stated
that Harvey "instantly was three inches from my nose [and] chin,
he's a fairly short guy... [and] I don't even remember what he was
saying - very loud, spitting in my face, accusing me of being insub-
ordinate.,175 A number of other men within the workplace also re-
ported regular mistreatment from Harvey. 176 The court intimated that
because the men did not manifest visible reactions to the same degree
as women, they must not have been similarly affected. 17 7 From the
facts presented in the case, however, there is little doubt that the of-
fice culture required the men to roll with the punches and to exter-
nally brush off Harvey's harassment, no matter how they felt inside.178
Essentially, Cloutier's experiences of workplace harassment were
discounted because they were the subtle, suppressed reactions to
stress typically exhibited by men. 179 Instead of focusing on such out-
ward appearances, courts should follow well-established precedent,
evaluating hostile work environment claims by determining whether
the conduct was "intimidating, hostile or offensive"'" to the reason-
able person, not on whether female reactions to office-wide harass-
ment were more intense than the reactions of males. While the men
in the office may have summed up Harvey's hostile behavior as part
of a '"we're all guys here' relationship,"'' this toleration and dismissal
does not render Harvey's behavior towards men benign. The court's
assumption that the men's muted responses meant they were not
equally harassed arguably frustrates the Ninth Circuit's effort to ad-
dress the basic workplace harassment issue it attempts to cure. This
decision acts only to further the original problem by codifying differ-
ences between sexes.
2. A Step Backward from Harris: Victims Need Not Manifest
Psychological Damage to Bring Suit
The Ninth Circuit's measure of victims' reactions to perceived
harassment is not an entirely new analysis. The United States
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 834.
178. See generally E.E.O.C.v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2005)
(noting at the end of the day the men would collect in an office to laugh and talk, regardless
of the day's events).
179. GARY NAMIE & RUTH NAMIE, THE BULLY AT WORK AND WHAT YOU CAN Do TO STOP
THE HURT AND RECLAIM YouR DIGNITY ON THE JOB 271 (2000) (noting that harassment
unrelated to gender, race, age, or some other Title VII protected category is unprotected
by the law).
180. EPSTEIN, supra note 101, at 381, n.30.
181. E.E.O.C. v. N.E.A., 422 F.3dat 846.
643
644 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 13:621
Supreme Court addressed a similar analysis in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc.'82 and found such an analysis impermissible. In that
case, the Court noted that requiring psychological injury to main-
tain a Title VII claim was untenable, as it violated the purpose of
Title VII. 8 3 The Court found that while psychological injury may be
evidence of a hostile work environment, it is not a requirement."'
In removing the requirement for a plaintiff to show such injury, the
Court created a rule effectuating justice and consistent with the pur-
pose of Title Vi'8
In Harris, the requirement that the victim actually perceive an
abusive environment was not conditioned on any manifestation of se-
vere psychological reactions.' 6 To the contrary, this court held that
'Title VII bars conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable per-
son's psychological well-being, but the statute is not limited to such
conduct. So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived,
and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to
be psychologically injurious."'8 7 The Court further stated that "[if]
the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abu-
sive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the vic-
tim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation,"'88 yet such
perception need not rise to the level of psychological injury to con-
stitute sexual harassment.
8 9
Despite this precedent, in EEOC v. NEA-Alaska, the Ninth
Circuit added an analysis of psychological injury, considering the
manifest reactions of workers. 9 ° In essence, the Ninth Circuit held
that the fact that the women displayed greater psychological damage
was relevant to determining whether they were treated differently
than the men.' 9 ' By basing the plaintiffs claim, in part, on manifes-
tations of reactions that were more severe than those of male co-
workers, the Ninth Circuit returns to an analysis that requires a
showing of psychological abuse to demonstrate injury. By reinstat-
ing an analysis that adds manifest psychological damage to the
182. 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Liesa L. Bernardin, Note, Does the Reasonable Woman Exist and Does She Have
Any Place in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VIIAfter Harris,
46 FLA. L. REV. 291, 313 (1994).
186. E.E.O.C. v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2005).
187. Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
188. Id. at 21-22.
189. Id. (noting Title VII is relevant prior to an individual suffering a nervous break-
down caused by the harassment).
190. E.E.O.C. v. N.E.A., 422 F.3d at 846.
191. Id. at 856-46.
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determination of disparate treatment, the Ninth Circuit takes a step
backward from the Supreme Court's finding in Harris. Just as the
Supreme Court held that psychological damage need not be shown
to support a Title VII action, 192 such consideration of whether women
manifest greater psychological damage than men is also unnecessary
to reach a finding of sexual harassment.
D. Confusion of Doctrine: Where the Ninth Circuit Went Wrong
Legal precedent clearly indicates that the measure of harm re-
quired in sexual harassment is perceived abuse.'93 Precedent also con-
firms that the measure of disparate treatment required is an objective
difference in the perpetrator's behavior towards each sex. 194 The Ninth
Circuit confuses these separate analyses in two ways. First, the Ninth
Circuit aims to measure whether women perceived more abuse than
men, in an effort to prove disparate treatment. 195 As previously stated,
perception of abuse should only be used to indicate whether a victim
was actually injured, not to indicate more injury than another sex
experienced. Second, the Ninth Circuit looks to the manifest reactions
of men and women to measure perceived abuse. 1" Basing the right to
recover on a finding that women were more psychologically affected
than men by similar treatment reinforces stereotypes of women as
the weaker sex, less emotionally stable, and less capable of dealing
with stress. Furthermore, psychological and medical research indi-
cates that men and women generally do not react outwardly to stress
in the same manner.19 v Taking into account manifestations of more
severe reactions, such as displays of greater psychological damage, is
repugnant to the concept of sexual equality. The Ninth Circuit's sub-
jective effects analysis assumes that an outward display of emotional
stress is indicative of abuse, whereas lack thereof would suggest an
absence of abuse. In truth, neither is sufficient to determine the true
effect of mistreatment.
Had the women in this case tried to "talk it out" with Harvey, had
they shrugged off his abuse in the same manner as male coworkers,
there would be no evidence of "sex-specific differences in the subjec-
tive effects of objectively identical behavior,"'98 an element the Ninth
Circuit held to be indicative of disparate treatment.199 While the
192. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
193. Id.
194. E.E.O.C. v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2005).
195. Id. at 846.
196. Id.
197. See Taylor et al., supra note 129, at 421-22.
198. E.E.O.C. v. N.E.A., 422 F.3d at 840.
199. Id.
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victims of sexual harassment must, of course, actually perceive an
abusive environment, 20 0 a quantitative analysis of whether women
were subjected to different treatment than men should suffice to
determine disparate treatment. Rather than determining whether
women manifest more severe reactions to harassment, public policy
should allow women to stand up to workplace bullies when faced with
such dominating behavior. If the women had stood up to Harvey's
threats and intimidation instead of succumbing to their tears and
worries, would they forfeit their claim for remedy?
In analyzing a hostile work environment claim that lacks sexual
animus, the Ninth Circuit not only requires that women be the
brunt of bullying more than their male counterparts, but also that
the women's outward reactions be more severe than men's.'01 Basing
recovery on a standard that expects women to experience greater
subjective injury not only assumes that women are less capable of
standing up to a bully, but also requires as much. While men and
women are certainly different in countless ways, this requirement
only perpetuates the stereotype that women are simply the more
vulnerable sex.
E. Impact of the Ninth Circuit's Subjective Effects Test on Legal
Doctrine
Although the Ninth Circuit decided the EEOC v. NEA-Alaska
case quite recently, court opinions, legal publications, and employ-
ment guides have already incorporated this decision and the subjec-
tive effects test.' The Ninth Circuit's emphasis on the subjective
effects experienced by the female plaintiffs in EEOC v. NEA-Alaska
cannot be dismissed as dicta or supporting detail. It is the unqualified
creation of a new subjective effects test to determine disparate treat-
ment, an extension of the Reasonable Woman standard into dispa-
rate treatment claims. Others within the legal community are clearly
placing weight on the Ninth Circuit's use of this subjective effects
test, incorporating it into existing legal doctrine and employment
200. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
201. E.E.O.C. v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 845-46 (9th Cir. 2005).
202. See, e.g., Pappas v. J.S.B. Holdings, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1103 (D. Ariz.
2005); HON. MING W. CHIN ETAL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION
§ 10:202 (2005); James 0. Castagnera et al., Ninth Circuit Allows Hostile Environment
Sex-Based Claim Against Abusive Supervisor, TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT BULLETIN,
Nov. 2005, at 5. The California Practice Guide cites EEOC v. NEA-Alaska to justify the
use of a subjective effects test to discern disparate treatment, noting that "[u]nder [the
Reasonable Woman] approach, evidence of differences in the subjective effects on women
of the same behavior toward men and women is relevant in determining whether the
workplace was objectively hostile to women." CHIN ETAL., supra note 202, § 10:02 (citing
E.E.O.C. v. N.E.A., 422 F.3d at 845-46).
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practices. 2°3 The creation of a subjective effects test should be care-
fully analyzed before being accepted as a suitable development of
the Reasonable Woman Standard.
III. MANIPULATING A GENERAL HARASSMENT CLAIM TO FIT A TITLE
VII ACTION IGNORES THE REAL PROBLEM: THE BIG BAD BULLY
Like many defendants in similar situations, Harvey claimed to
be an Equal-Opportunity Harasser, a bully who abused all subordi-
nates without regard for gender differences." 4 Surprisingly, the
Equal-Opportunity Harasser defense, if proven, often results in the
bully's triumph, leaving the plaintiff without a method of recovery.2 5
To recover under Title VII, the plaintiff must prove that the alleged
harassment was motivated by the victim's gender, race, country of
origin, or religion.0 6 A plaintiff who complains of general harassment
that lacks such motivation has no comparable legal protection.20 7
This is where Title VII fails victims of workplace harassment.0 8
In effect, Title VII creates somewhat of a quandary, offering pro-
tection from workplace harassment only if it is directed at certain
classes of people. 2 9 As the Washington Post so aptly stated, "what
bothers people about abusive workplace conduct, after all, is not the
fact that it may be discriminatory but that it is abusive in the first
place. 210 Some bullies have no discriminatory purpose behind their
bad behavior; their harassment is not based on characteristics of the
victim and does not qualify as discrimination.21' Title VII, however,
is reserved to those plaintiffs who can show that their victimization
was motivated by discriminatory factors.212 Allowing, in fact requiring,
203. See Pappas, 392 F.Supp.2d at 1103; CHIN ETAL., supra note 202.
204. E.E.O.C. v. N.E.A., 422 F.3d at 845-46 (denying allegations that Harvey treated
women differently than men, while stating that the difference was incidental because
he interacted more frequently with women).
205. See, e.g., Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 401-07 (7th Cir. 2001) (the Seventh
Circuit permitted Equal Opportunity Harassment when it affirmed a district court opinion
holding that equal, albeit harassing, treatment of both sexes failed to rise to the level of
a Title VII violation as it does not show the harassment was based on one of the protected
categories of Title VII).
206. Civil Rights Act of 1964.
207. Gary Namie & Ruth Namie, The Workplace Bullying & Trauma Inst., Workplace
Bullying: Introduction to the 'Silent Epidemic, 'available at http://www.bullybusters.org/
advocacy/pdf-docs/overview.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) (noting the majority of bullying
is same sex, normally excluded from workplace policies, and outside the law's protection).
208. Id.
209. Id. (acknowledging that the law ignores the majority of bullying).
210. Editorial, Justice Scalia and Mr. Oncale, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 8, 1998,
at C6.
211. Namie & Namie, supra note 207.
212. Civil Rights Act of 1964.
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plaintiffs to characterize harassment as status-based has resulted
in the muddling of Title VII doctrine, the justification of the Equal-
Opportunity Harasser, and the lack of legal recourse for victims of
general workplace harassment.
Congress wrote Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 to com-
bat discrimination based on race, national origin, religion, or sex.
213
This legislation was never intended to remedy general workplace ha-
rassment.214 Courts have consistently made efforts to protect the in-
tent of this doctrine by reserving it for those intended purposes.
215
The Supreme Court has cautioned that Title VII does not pro-
tect against commonplace offenses that happen in the workplace
and do not rise to the level of severe or pervasive.216 In Faragher v.
Boca Raton,1 7 the Court found that "ordinary tribulations of the
workplace" do not fall within the ambit of Title VII. 28 Ten years
later, the Supreme Court reiterated that Title VII should not be ex-
panded into "a general civility code."2 9 The Tenth Circuit endorsed
this view, stating that "incidents of rudeness" are insufficient to suc-
ceed on a claim for retaliation under Title VII.22° The Eastern District
of Pennsylvania came to a similar conclusion in Acosta v. Catholic
Health Initiatives, Inc., denying a male employee's claim of sexual
harassment predicated on typical difficulties experienced in the work-
place.221 Although courts should not attempt to operate as a super
human resources department for all workplaces, there is good reason
to outlaw those incidents that rise above rudeness to the level of sub-
stantial harassment.
By providing widespread legal protection from workplace harass-
ment, federal courts can remedy each component of the tri-fold prob-
lem. Providing this recourse under federal law would remove the
motivation for plaintiffs to unduly characterize general harassment
claims as motivated by discrimination, thus leaving intact the Title
VII discrimination doctrine. The Equal-Opportunity Harasser would
no longer walk free. Most importantly, all victims would have legal
recourse against the Big Bad Bully.
213. Id.
214. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 102 (1998).
215. See id. at 1002-03 (noting how both Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson and Harris
v. Forklift Systems Inc. worked to prevent Title VII from becoming a general civility code
by rejecting interpretations of Title VII as encompassing routine work interactions).
216. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 1003 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993)).
217. 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1988).
218. Id.
219. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81; see also Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 F.3d 980, 982 (6th Cir.
2000) ('"Title VII is not 'a general civility code for the American workplace."').
220. Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1265 (10th Cir. 1998).
221. No. 02-1750, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1079, *31-32 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
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A. The Equal Opportunity Harasser: A Vile but Valid Defense
One shocking reality of sexual harassment law is that a super-
visor who admittedly harasses both men and women has a solid de-
fense against a disparate treatment charge in many jurisdictions,
known as the Equal Opportunity Harasser.222 Without a disparate
treatment claim, the plaintiffs are left without evidence that the
harassment was "because of sex" and therefore cannot support their
claim.223 This legal gap in the protection of victims against sexual
harassment exists in state law, as well as in most federal circuits.224
Courts accepting this defense rationalize that male and female em-
ployees subjected to the same hostile workplace face no sex-based
discrimination, but they are instead treated equally.225 Ironically, by
abusing more employees, the offending supervisor escapes legal con-
sequences for his actions.226
In Holman v. Indiana, a classic example of the "Equal Opportu-
nity Harasser," a husband and wife both brought sexual harassment
claims against their supervisor under Title VIL227 The plaintiffs al-
leged that their supervisor propositioned each for sex on several oc-
casions.22 When both the husband and wife rebuffed the supervisor's
advances, he retaliated by depriving each of them of certain work-
place benefits.229 The district court held that because the defendant
had harassed both a male and a female, there was no disparate treat-
ment and therefore no discrimination.23 ° As Holman v. Indiana
demonstrates, plaintiffs must differentiate themselves from other
harassed employees in the workplace to bring a successful claim.231
Without such differentiation, plaintiffs have little hope of prosecut-
ing their harassers. This requirement of differentiation encourages
plaintiffs to characterize workplace harassment as discrimination,
even when a more general charge of workplace harassment may be
222. See Shylah Miles, Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Defense: Eliminating the Equal-
Opportunity-Harasser Defense, 76 WASH. L. REV. 603, 615 (2001) (examining two circuit
court decisions that found equal treatment of both sexes would defeat a Title VII claim).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 604 (indicating the State of Washington also has a legal gap in the pro-
tection of victims of sexual harassment).
225. Id. at 614-15.
226. See Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2001).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 405 (affirming the district court's denial of plaintiffs claim even though
both husband and wife were subject to sexual harassment; because they suffered similarly,
they are outside of Title VII protections).
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appropriate. Including the discrimination requirement in such claims
ignores the growing epidemic of workplace harassment.232
B. Workplace Harassment: A Widespread Problem Beyond
Discrimination
According to a study conducted by the Workplace Bullying &
Trauma Institute (WBTI), general workplace bullying is a problem
far more common than illegal discrimination.233 Illegal discrimination
refers to harassment in which the victimized employee, or "target,"
is a member of a protected class under Title VII.234 The WBTI study
indicates that "[b]ullying... is three times more prevalent [than the]
illegal variety, which itself is a subset of the more general variety. 235
o B-T Same & Protected: 27%
* B-T Same & Not Protected: 33%
M B Only Protected: 15%
o T Only Protected: 25%
236
232. Namie & Namie, supra note 207 (claiming bullying affects twenty-six million
workers a year and occurs three times more than illegal harassment).
233. WBI REPORT, supra note 8.
234. Id. at 4 (noting that only twenty-five percent of the cases in the study involved
members of a group protected by civil rights legislation).
235. Id.
236. See Namie & Namie, supra note 207 for data contained in graph (referencing state-
wide Michigan study reported in Keashly, L. & Jagatic, K., The Nature, Extent, and Impact
of Emotional Abuse in the Workplace: Results of a Statewide Survey, paper presented at
the Academy of Management Conference, Toronto, Canada (Aug. 4-9, 2000)).
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A number of studies concerning workplace harassment show that
between one-in-fourteen to one-in-five employees have experienced
substantial workplace harassment,237 yet bullying without a discrimi-
natory animus is generally not actionable within the court system.
While anti-discrimination laws provide recourse for discriminatory
harassment, there is no legal protection specifically targeting general-
ized workplace bullying.239 Without such protection, employees are
left with only a handful of possible claims under which they may sue
for workplace harassment. Aside from Title VII discrimination, em-
ployees may cite 1) intentional infliction of emotional distress, 2) in-
terference with one's employment relationship, 3) harassment that
follows "whistle-blowing," the reporting of an employer's actions, or,
in some cases, 4) defamation of character.24 °
While these legal remedies provide relief in a number of work-
place harassment suits, they are only appropriate for specific types
of harassment and leave many victims of workplace harassment with-
out an appropriate cause of action. To qualify as intentional infliction
of emotional distress, a bullying supervisor's conduct "would have
to be repeated, severe and pervasive.... It would have to create es-
sentially a hostile work environment."24' Similarly, a claim of inter-
ference with one's employment relationship requires that the plain-
tiff prove that the harassment not only occurred but also altered the
working environment to such a degree as to interfere with the work-
ing relationship.242
A variety of United States laws assert that stress and humilia-
tion are routine parts of the normal work environment and maintain
237. Margarita Bauza, What To Do About A Really Bad Boss, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
May 1, 2005, available at http://www.workdoctor.com/press/detfreep05OlO5.html ("One
of 14 people in Michigan say they regularly experience aggression at the hands of a boss.');
Loraleigh Keashly & Joel H. Neuman, Bullying in the Workplace: It's Impact and
Management, 8 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'YJ. 335, 339-40 (2004) (presenting empirical
and conceptual data on workplace bullying and aggression); Namie & Namie, supra note
207 (extrapolating that "about one in six American workers is bullied"); NAMIE & NAMIE,
supra note 179, at 271 (noting that seventy-five percent of the sample left their jobs to
escape bullying).
238. NAMIE & NAMIE, supra note 179 (noting that harassment unrelated to the protected
categories of Title VII is generally unprotected by the law).
239. Penelope W. Brunner & Melinda L. Costello, When the Wrong Woman Wins:
Building Bullies and Perpetuating Patriarch, ADVANCING WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP (Spring
2003), http://www.advancingwomen.com/awl/spring2003/BRUNNE-l.HTML.
240. Id.; see also Diane E. Lewis, Bullying Bosses, BOSTON GLOBE, June 5, 2005,
available at http://www.bullyinginstitute.org/press/globe60505.html; Catherine Saillant,
A Bulwark Against Bullies, Los ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 5, 2005, available at http:/www
.bullyinginstitute.org/press/latimesl205O5.html.
241. Saillant, supra note 240.
242. Lewis, supra note 240.
651
652 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 13:621
our legal system cannot and should not punish them all.243 Accord-
ingly, only intentionally inflicted emotional distress that rises to the
level of "outrageous" and harmful is considered unlawful.244 Harass-
ment following an employee's attempt to report a supervisor's illegal
activity is prohibited by law and requires a certain set of circum-
stances for a successful cause of action. To prove a case of retaliation
following an employee's act of whistle-blowing, the plaintiff employee
must prove three elements: (1) the employee engaged in conduct pro-
tected by statute; (2) the plaintiff was subjected to adverse employ-
ment action; and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the
protected whistle-blowing action taken.2 45 The Eleventh Circuit court
has noted that "[a]t a minimum, a plaintiff must generally establish
that the employer was actually aware of the protected expression at
the time it took the adverse employment action. The defendant's
awareness of the protected statement, however, may be established
by circumstantial evidence. 246
Although this cause of action may at first appear somewhat
removed from sexual harassment, it is a complaint that commonly
accompanies such claims. In a case against the City College of New
York, three women brought both claims against their bullying boss.247
To make their sexual harassment claim, the women alleged that
while their supervisor bristled at dissension from male employees,
he was intolerant of any disagreement from women.24 The plaintiffs
further alleged that their boss showed no support for the female staff
and passed them over for promotions based on gender, yet these plain-
tiffs could not convince the court to prove that they were mistreated
on the basis of sex.249 Along with their harassment complaint, the
women also alleged that after they filed the complaint of sexual ha-
rassment, their boss retaliated against them.25° The United States
District Court found that the retaliation claim alone violated federal
law, noting that the plaintiffs had significant evidence to prove this
243. Catherine L. Fisk, Humiliation at Work, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 73, 73
(2001).
244. Id. (referencing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 (1965)).
245. Farley v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999) (refer-
encing Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 1997)).
246. Roberts v. Ravonier. Inc., 135 Fed. App. 351, 358 (11th Cir. 2005).
247. Catriona Stewart, HEO Lawsuit nets $1 Million, CLARION (Bullying Institute, New
York, N.Y.), May 2005, at 4.
248. Id.
249. Id. ("Judge Buchwald ruled that there was not a clear enough pattern'to conclude
that the work environment plaintiffs faced was made so due to their gender[....
250. Id.
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second point.25' This case demonstrates several points: first, that
sexual discrimination is difficult to prove in this type of "he said, she
said" situation;... second, that discrimination must fall within the
boundaries of statutory protection to be actionable;253 and third, that
these women may have been left without a cause of action had they
not filed a complaint alleging retaliation, one of the narrow protected
areas of workplace harassment.254 Indeed, while there was no question
that the plaintiffs experienced pervasive, ongoing harassment at work,
their harassment action failed for want of a nexus with gender. The
plaintiffs only succeeded on their subsequent claim of retaliation.
The expansion of sexual harassment doctrine into disparate treat-
ment sexual harassment has allowed many women to sue bullying
bosses, a serious problem within the workplace, in which eighty per-
cent of the targets tend to be women.255 Plaintiffs, men and women
alike, are able to recover for workplace bullying when targeted on the
basis of sexual discrimination.256 Stated differently, plaintiffs can only
succeed in such a claim if able to prove that they are bullied more
than coworkers of the opposite sex.257 Equally troubling is the truth
that only a fraction of workplace abuse is covered under Title VII.
According to one study, employees are most often bullied because the
employee asserted independence and refused to be controlled by the
bully.258 This distinction had little to do with whether the victim of
abuse was male or female.259 One study ranked fourteen reasons
why bullies target certain individuals, none of which pointed to gen-
der as a motivating factor.26° This finding could indicate that laws
251. Stewart, supra note 247.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. WBI REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
256. See Miles, supra note 222, at 604 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 82 (1998)).
257. Id. at 606.
258. WBI REPORT, supra note 8, at 8.
259. Interestingly, this statistic was marginally affected by whether the bully was male
or female: seventy-five percent of male bullies versus sixty-one percent of female bullies
targeted employees for this reason. Id.
260. The investigator found that the following reasons motivated workplace harassment:
(1) 1 remained independent, refused to be controlled or to be subservient (70%)
(2) My competence and reputation were threatening (67%)
(3) The bully's personality (59%)
(4) My being liked by co-workers and customers (47%)
(5) In retaliation for my reporting unethical or illegal conduct, whistle-blowing
(38%)
(6) 1 was focused solely on work and ignored the politics (36%)
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banning discriminatory harassment fail to address much of work-
place harassment.
Although harassment claims are actionable under Title VII with
an animus based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,"26' the
overwhelming majority of workplace harassment claims do not fall
within the scope of Title VII. Workplace bullying is becoming less so-
cially tolerable and a more common basis for legal action. To recover
from a bully, however, plaintiffs must carefully shape their argu-
ments to fit the mold of Title VII.262 In many cases, however, work-
place bullying is not based on the target's gender but on some other
attribute of the target or bully in question.263
1. Gender and Bullying: Women Most Often Selected as
Targets
The Workplace Bullying & Trauma Institute264 highlights how
gender affects who is bullied and why.265 Although this study shows
little direct relationship to gender in terms of why victims believe
they are singled out for harassment, it notes an interesting phe-
nomenon: bullies tend to be male and female in equal proportions,
yet both male and female bosses tend to select female victims most
of the time.266 Specifically, men are selected as victims of workplace
harassment twenty percent of the time, while women are bullied an
astonishing eighty percent of the time.26 ' Even more surprising, fe-
male bosses tended to victimize female subordinates more often than
male subordinates.268
(7) Bully had personal problems (35%)
(8) I am nonconfrontive [sic] and easily overrun by others (33%)
(9) It was at a time of personal med or life vulnerability or changes (30%)
(10) 1 could not afford to leave the job and the bully knew it (30%)
(11) It was my turn in the rotation among co-workers (29%)
(12) No apparent reason; I do not know (28%)
(13) Result of the bully's promotion or newness to my workplace (25%)
(14) The bully was following either explicit or 'understood' instructions from
boss above (19%)
Id. at 8.
261. Civil Rights Act of 1964.
262. Lewis, supra note 240.
263. See generally WBI REPORT, supra note 8, at 8.
264. Workplace Bullying Institute, http://www.bullyinginstitute.org/index.html (last
visited Feb. 15, 2007).
265. See WBI REPORT, supra note 8, at 10.
266. Id. at 4.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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M Women-on-Women: 50%
M Men-on-Women: 30%
E3 Women-on-Men: 12%
E3 Men-on-Men: 8%
269
In a society that strives to achieve equal treatment and the pro-
motion of women to gain equal footing with men within the work-
place, this phenomenon raises a number of concerns for women in
the workplace.
The bullying of women in the workplace may be partially respon-
sible for perpetuating the so-called glass ceiling that women often face.
In her book, Why So Slow? The Advancement of Women,270 author
Virginia Valian asserts that stereotypes and biases of gender, particu-
larly differences in workplace evaluation and treatment, continue to
perpetuate this glass ceiling.271 For men, this stereotype schema in-
cludes "being capable of independent, autonomous action ... asser-
tive, instrumental, and task-oriented." '272 For women, the schema is
described as "being nurturant, expressive, communal, and concerned
about others."27 ' Both men and women may express all of these be-
havioral traits to some degree; men traditionally exhibit more of the
"masculine" traits while women present more of "feminine" traits. 4
269. See id. for data used in graph.
270. VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN 1-3 (1998).
271. Id. at 3.
272. Id. at 13.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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This distinction becomes important when viewed in terms of the be-
havior that corporate America tends to value most. Corporate culture
is often defined in masculine terms, and "feminine attributes are
valued only in the most marginal sense." '275 The criteria for advance-
ment established in corporate America is often based on stereotyp-
ical male characteristics such as aggressiveness, competitiveness,
and autonomy.276
The Workplace Bullying & Trauma Institute's study echoes this
dichotomy of feminine and masculine traits, as it describes how male
and female bullies differ in their bullying style.277 Generally, the male
bullies in this study tended to utilize the business place hierarchy,
while female bullies tended to manipulate the social network within
the workplace to effectuate bullying.278 Male and female bullies also
engaged in different bullying behaviors. Specifically, male perpetrators
more often used bullying techniques such as: public screaming; illegal
verbal insults based on gender, race, accent or disability; sabotaging
a worker's contribution; retaliation following complaints of harass-
ment; threatening physical harm; and engaging in physical sexual
aggression.279 Male perpetrators tended to choose their targets based
on a target's asserted independence and a target's failure to recognize
and follow workplace politics.28 °
Female perpetrators were more likely to use the silent treatment
to punish targets, ice out and separate targets, and encourage col-
leagues and other subordinates to turn against the target.2"' Female
perpetrators were most likely to choose targets based on a perceived
threat posed by the target's competence and reputation, newness of
the perpetrator's relationship with the target, and passivity or sub-
servient demeanor from the target when bullied.28 2
In her article, When the Wrong Woman Wins: Building Bullies
and Perpetuating Patriarch, Penelope Brunner contends that work-
place bullying is "the amplified acting out of masculine behaviors
that range from blatant demonstrations such as aggressively scream-
ing, yelling, and threatening dismissals to subtle, underhanded
275. ROBIN J. ELY & DEBRA E. MEYERSON, THEORIES OF GENDER IN ORGANIZATIONS:
A NEW APPROACH TO ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS AND CHANGE 109 (2000).
276. LoTTE BAILYN, BREAKING THE MOLD: REDESIGNING WORK FOR PRODUCTIVE AND
SATISFYING LIVES 28 (2006) (explaining how gender inequality and ineffectiveness are
perpetuated through the machine of corporate America).
277. WBI REPORT, supra note 8, at 5.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 6.
280. Id. at 8.
281. Id. at 7.
282. Id. at 8.
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displays." '283 Yet this characterization of bullying as amplified mascu-
line traits fails to recognize that women tend to bully differently and
more in line with traditionally feminine behavioral traits.284 While
the targets of workplace harassment are overwhelmingly female em-
ployees, those perpetuating this harassment are almost equally male
and female.285
Bully bosses do share certain characteristics, without regard for
gender. Business experts say that many bullying bosses are highly
motivated, high-performance individuals with successful track re-
cords, characteristics that make them attractive choices for leader-
ship positions.286 While effective, it is how bullies accomplish these
goals that is problematic, as bullies tend to "motivate" by way of in-
timidation and inappropriate use of power.28 7 According to David
Sirota, author of The Enthusiastic Employee: How Companies Profit
by Giving Workers What They Want, bullying bosses tend to exhibit
the same general tactics: they are usually deferential to their supe-
riors and vicious to their subordinates." Sirota notes that "[t]heirs is
a personality that is clicking heels with their bosses and stomping on
anyone who is in any way weaker, and certainly with subordinates. 289
One expert differentiates between bullies along behavioral traits,
as opposed to gender traits. Arthur Bell, a business professor at the
University of San Francisco and consultant and author of You Can't
Talk to Me that Way, describes three different kinds of bully bosses
based on particular behavioral traits.29 ° First, the "sarcastic boss" is
one who verbally assaults employees, humiliating them by making
derogatory remarks about them or their work.29' Second, Bell de-
scribes the "assassin boss," one who degrades employees through gos-
sip or criticism among others.292 Finally,"bosses who prey on worker's
vulnerabilities" are those who criticize employees' individual qual-
ities, such as physical appearance or behavior. 293 No matter what
283. Brunner & Costello, supra note 239.
284. WBI REPORT, supra note 8, at 7.
285. Id. at 4.
286. Blanca Torres, Beastly Bosses, BALTIMORE SUN, July 6, 2005, available at http:I
www.workdoctor.com/press/baltsun07O6O5.html.
287. Id.
288. Bauza, supra note 237.
289. Id.
290. Torres, supra note 286; see also ARTHUR H. BELL, YOU CAN'T TALK To ME THAT
WAY!: STOPPING Toxic LANGUAGE IN THE WORKPLACE (Christopher Carolei ed., 2005).
291. Id.
292. Id.; Torres, supra note 286 ("A lot of bully bosses lower productivity.").
293. Id.
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tactics bullies employ to harass subordinates, the effects can be de-
bilitating for employees and businesses.
2. Effects of Bullying on Employees
Loraleigh Keashly, academic director of the Dispute Resolution
program at Wayne State University, states that "[workplace harass-
ment] has implications on productivity. 294 She explains the severity
of this impact: "People who are exposed to chronic workplace prob-
lems have similar symptoms as those who suffer from post-traumatic
stress disorder. They have anxiety [and a] depressed mood." '295 These
symptoms of workplace harassment can affect workers' productivity
levels at the workplace. 296 Furthermore, studies indicate that a posi-
tive correlation exists between employment mistreatment and em-
ployee theft, sabotage, and tardiness. 297 'There's a slew of studies
that show how you treat people has a major effect on how committed
people feel to an organization," says Mike Roehling, a labor relations
professor at Michigan State University.29 He says further that stud-
ies consistently show that treating people well is essential to retain-
ing good employees.299
Although the bullying boss is clearly the source of trouble in such
who is fired instances, the victim, the target of harassment, is usually
the person or feels forced to quit. °0 According to the Workplace Bully-
ing and Trauma Institute, targets of harassment are four times more
likely to be fired than their bullying boss.30 1 In fact, eighty-seven per-
cent of the time, victims of harassment "pay by losing their once-
cherished positions" to put an end to the bullying.0 2 All too often,
supervisors who manage with bully power are considered effective
and are therefore rewarded for what is perceived to be assertive,
direct management.0 3
294. Bauza, supra note 237.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. WBI REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Brunner & Costello, supra note 239 (citing J.D. Russell, Bully in the Office,
VARBUSINESS, Mar. 5, 2001, available at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document
?_ansset=GeHauKO-EVYRMsSEVYRUUWR).
2007] LITTLE RED REASONABLE WOMAN AND THE BIG BAD BULLY 659
30f
20-
10-
0.
Yr therum cas get 7to et he. w LSerr lsed- alsflr't.- 33% 1oatd
ern, 
atC . 9 0
304
For those employees who keep their jobs and endure ongoing bully-
ing, the trauma caused does not stop at the workplace. 0 Strong evi-
dence suggests that stress from workplace harassment spills over
into people's lives outside of work, affecting marriages and family
life. 306 Harassment has many secondary victims, including families
and coworkers.3"7
3. Effects of Bullying on Companies
Although anti-bullying policies face much opposition from em-
ployers,08 the cost of bullies to companies can be extraordinary. The
expense of bullies may seem minimal on the surface, but this vola-
tile liability has many hidden costs for employers. 30 9 Businesses pay
the price when good employees, unwilling to deal with a bully, decide
to leave the company.310 By harassing those who stay, bullies cost
companies millions by distracting others from their work.311 Accord-
ing to a 2002 study of nine thousand government employees, work-
place bullies caused $1.5 million in lost time and productivity.312
304. See WBI REPORT, supra note 8, at 3, for data used in graph.
305. Bauza, supra note 237.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Saillant, supra note 240.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Liz Urbanski Farrell, Workplace Bullying's High Cost: $180M in Lost Time,
Productivity, ORLANDO Bus. J., Mar. 15, 2002, available at http://orlando.bizjournals.com/
orlando/stories/2002/03/18/focusl.html).
312. Id.
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When a harassed employee seeks legal action, the cost of defending
a harassment lawsuit can be staggering, often costing employers
anywhere from thousands to millions of dollars.313 Workplace stress
created by bullies results in increased health insurance costs, addi-
tional absenteeism, and more workers' compensation claims.314 The
cost of providing health insurance, already a sizable expense for em-
ployers, has a positive correlation to stress endured by employees." 5
The physical and physiological side effects caused by workplace stress
are quite serious and expensive.1 6 A 1994 landmark study indicated
that companies need to focus on creating a healthy corporate culture
to minimize healthcare costs and increase the health of workers." 7
Employers would do well to take note of how bullying affects workers,
the workplace, and ultimately the bottom line.3"'
IV. A CALL FOR A DIFFERENT STANDARD
Current research clearly indicates that general workplace harass-
ment is a widespread problem that warrants judicial and Congressio-
nal attention.31 9 Our current laws provide remedies for harassment
that rises to the level of intentionally inflicted emotional distress and
assault and battery. This well-established body of law, however, in-
variably fails to cover the gaping hole of workplace harassment. °
By overlooking workplace harassment that falls short of such torts,
our justice system fails to recognize the debilitating effects of bullying
on a large portion of the country's working class.3  Some plaintiffs
have found refuge in Title VII, succeeding when harassment stems
from a discriminatory animus.322 Yet for many bullies the motive to
313. Stewart, supra note 247; Sarah Rohrs & Kenneth Brooks, Bullied Teacher Wins
$225,000 Bully Principal and District Supporters Costs Employer Over $545,000, Total!,
TIMES-HERALD, Feb. 13, 2006, available at http://www.bullyinginstitute.org/bbstudies/
northcutt.html.
314. Press Release, Lluminari Inc., New Study Links Workplace Gender Issues to Stress,
Health Risks, and Rising Health Care Costs (June 3, 2004), available at http://www
.embracingwomenshealth.comlabout/press/lluminarifLandmarkStudyLeadRelease .pdf.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 3 (Marianne Legato, M.D., founder and director of the Partnership for
Gender-Based Medicine at Columbia University, reports that "[t]he incidence of cardio-
vascular disease almost doubles, as does the use of potentially addictive substances like
alcohol, tranquilizers and mood elevators, if an employee is uncomfortable or not really
at ease in a workplace and if he or she feels stressed in a workplace").
317. Id.
318. Torres, supra note 286.
319. See WBI REPORT, supra note 8.
320. Id.
321. Fisk, supra note 243, at 73.
322. Id.
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mistreat stems from other grounds,3 23 and Title VII provides no
answer. Rather than extending the doctrine of Title VII to include
claims of general workplace harassment, a clearer and more effec-
tive development would be to create legal protection for all workers
from workplace harassment.
A. The Need for Anti-Bullying Legislation
One could assert that employers should be obligated to protect
all employees from abusive supervisors. As previously discussed, how-
ever, employers often fail to stop bullying without a legal obligation.
An opposite argument exists, that the law has no business regulat-
ing worker interactions and that the corporate world should bear the
burden of self-regulation.324 To their credit, some businesses, both
public and private, already have guidelines in place prohibiting work-
place bullying, and these organizations strive to inculcate workplace
culture with policies of respect and an intolerance for abuse.
The Peralta Community College District Board is one such orga-
nization that has made significant strides in this direction after ex-
periencing the effects of workplace bullying first-hand.325 In 2002,
a math teacher victimized by a workplace bully brought his com-
plaints before the District Board, asking for the Board to act on his
behalf. 326 Instead of offering assistance, the Board took the side of
the harasser, a common response to reports of workplace bullying,327
and punished the math teacher for his allegations.3 2 The Board even-
tually reversed its decision two years later, vindicating the wronged
math teacher.32 9 This complaint inspired the Board to enact an anti-
bullying policy in 2004, complete with seminars to educate employ-
ees about the policy. 3 ° The Peralta Community College Board's anti-
bullying policy serves as an example to other public organizations
looking to protect workers with written policies.33'
Many private companies also have policies against workplace
harassment, but without a self-governing mechanism to deal with re-
sulting claims, such policies have little, if any, bite. 'Most company
323. WBI REPORT, supra note 8, at 8.
324. Saillant, supra note 240 (citing Los Angeles attorney Michael Bononi, an expert
in employment law, who posits that the private sector has effectively confronted the issue
of general workplace harassment without the intervention of courts and legislation).
325. Id. (discussing a similar policy proposed in Ventura County and comparing it to
the existing anti-bullying policy of the Peralta Community College District).
326. Id.
327. See supra Part III.B.2.
328. Saillant, supra note 240.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
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handbooks have a policy against harassment," reports Shane
Bengoechea, a Boise, Idaho attorney, but he warns that "it's hard to
enforce in court because the handbook is not considered an employ-
ment contract.... Many managers know that if an employee takes
action against them for bullying, [employees] won't win. 332 Public and
private businesses alike fail to protect their employees from work-
place abuse, even when the abuse is well known by those who have
the power to effectuate change.333 Without proper protection pro-
vided by companies, legislatures, or courts, responsible parties may
be left wondering who is at fault.
As the case of EEOC v. NEA-Alaska demonstrates, when business
policies and existing laws both fail to protect employees, some victims
of harassment will be left without recourse.334 As aptly noted in the
Termination of Employment Bulletin: "It is more than surprising that
a teacher's union would tolerate the behavior described here toward
its employees, regardless of whether it violates Title VII or not."3 5
Although setting guidelines and policies are certainly a step in
the right direction, the corporate world is ill-prepared to handle the
pandemic of workplace harassment plaguing our country. The respon-
sibility of protecting workers from general workplace lies in the hands
of lawmakers and cannot be left to the consciences of employers.
Under current laws, courts have the power to protect some but not
all victims of workplace harassment. 36 For those who cannot claim
discrimination as the animus for their distress, current harassment
laws offer inadequate protection. This shortcoming cannot be solved
by erroneously extending Title VII to protect those outside of its
scope. To preserve existing sexual harassment doctrine and develop
alternative workplace discrimination doctrine, courts and legislatures
can accomplish both goals by introducing and enforcing legislation
targeting status-blind workplace harassment.
B. Current Legislation Initiatives in the United States and Abroad
The governments of Australia and some European nations, in-
cluding the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, France, and Sweden,
332. P. L. Murphy, When Bullies Rule the Boardroom, BOISE WEEKLY, Jan. 18, 2006,
available at http://www.bullybusters.org/press/boisewkly011806.html.
333. Id. (quoting Mr. Bengoechea: "A lot of companies simply don't want to do much
about bully situations").
334. While the female plaintiffs in EEOC v. NEA-Alaska recovered for their injuries,
their male counterparts, also harassed by supervisor Harvey, cannot claim the same legal
protection. See E.E.O.C. v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2005).
335. Castagnera et al., supra note 202.
336. Targeting Workplace Bullies, CANADA'S SAFETY COUNCIL, available at http:/lwww
.safety-council.org/info/OSH/bully-law.html#top (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
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have established anti-bullying laws.337 Quebec, Canada passed anti-
bullying legislation in June of 2004.338 This new law, named the
Labour Standards Law in Quebec (Canada), is the first law of its kind
to exist in North America to combat status-blind workplace harass-
ment.339 Quebec's anti-bullying law defines bullying as "any vexatious
behaviour in the form of repeated and hostile or unwanted conduct,
verbal comments, actions or gestures that affect an employee's dignity
or psychological or physical integrity .... ,34o Quebec's law has proven
very effective in addressing workplace harassment and providing re-
course for victimized employees.341 The Canadian legislature proposed
similar legislation, but it died when it went up for vote in 2004.342
The United States government has yet to pose any comparable
legislation, and currently no laws exist protecting Americans from
status-blind workplace harassment,343 yet Americans may soon find
state governments offering such protection.344 To date, nine states
have proposed legislation prohibiting workplace harassment, with
the number of such state legislative initiatives growing every year."
Beginning in 2003, California was the first state to propose a law
targeting status-blind workplace harassment, although the bill died
in the Assembly Labor committee.346 Oklahoma's House of Repre-
sentatives introduced a similar bill less than a year later.347 Much
like its California predecessor, Oklahoma's bill died in the Commerce,
Industry, and Labor Committee.348 In January of 2005, Hawaii's
Senate and House simultaneously introduced two similar compan-
ion bills to target workplace harassment; although both bills passed
initial readings, they also died in committees. 349 Washington, Oregon,
and Massachusetts all introduced comparable legislation in 2005.350
Washington's bill met a similar death in committee, and no action
337. Soares, supra note 131.
338. Id. (summarizing an eighteen month status report by Professor Angelo Soares of
the University of Quebec at Montreal).
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. The author notes that most employers who sued under this legislation failed to
have any practices in place to prevent workplace harassment.
342. Targeting Workplace Bullies, supra note 336.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Bullybusters.org, A Guide to Citizen Lobbying, http://bullybusters.org/advocacy/
legisadv.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) (tracking proposed legislation targeting work-
place bullies).
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
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was taken on Oregon's bill.35' Massachusetts took a different route
by introducing its anti-bullying bill to the House based on a voter-
approved Public Policy Question. 2 Furthermore, instead of proposing
a law explicitly prohibiting workplace harassment, Massachusetts's
bill proposes conducting a study to determine the cost of workplace
harassment to workers, families, and businesses in terms of health-
care and insurance costs.353 Based on the outcome of that study, the
Massachusetts bill mandates that the Division of Occupational Safety
will create a policy for businesses employing fifty or more people,
defining and preventing workplace harassment."' This House bill
has passed the Senate and awaits decision in committees.355 In 2006,
Missouri and Kansas joined the initiative to pass anti-bullying leg-
islation.356 Both bills have been referred to committees and await
decision.5 7
New York State has most recently added its name to the list of
states attempting to introduce anti-bullying legislation. 58 In May of
2006, parallel bills were simultaneously introduced in the state house
and senate, aimed at directing the house of labor to study workplace
harassment and report its findings to the legislature and governor.359
The simultaneous introduction of this bill signals the legislature's
recognition of the debilitating effects of workplace harassment on the
social and economic well-being of workers, families, and businesses."'
These legislatures further recognize that the pervasiveness of work-
place harassment has an overall detrimental effect on society and
the economy at large.36'
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. H. 3809., 184th General Court (Mass. 2005), available at http://bullybusters.org/
advocacy/legis-ma2.html.
354. Id.
355. Massachusetts Legislative Tracking System, House No. 3809, http://www.mass
.gov/legis/184history/h03809.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. S. 8018, A. 11565, 30th Gen. Assem. (N.Y. 2006), available at http:Ilassembly
.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A04921&sh=t (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
359. The bill provides in part:
The department of labor is hereby authorized and directed to study hostile
workplace behavior, including psychological and emotional abuse, and its
consequences, including but not limited to costs incurred by the workers'
compensation system, and shall develop recommendations to reduce work-
place abuse and harassment; and report its findings to the legislature and
the governor within one year of the effective date of this act.
Id.
360. Id.
361. "Mhe social and economic well-being of the state is dependent upon healthy and
productive employees. Research on hostile workplace behaviors indicates that a signifi-
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This recognition represents a crucial step toward providing a
harassment-free workplace for all employees and a cause of action
for every harassed employee. Although Title VII currently provides
a remedy for harassment stemming from discrimination, such anti-
bullying legislation must be introduced to provide a remedy for all
victims of workplace abuse.362 By introducing such legislation, state
legislatures can encourage employer responsibility in preventing
workplace harassment and create a viable cause of action for all
victims of workplace harassment.
CONCLUSION
Manipulating general workplace harassment claims to fit within
the scope of Title VII not only misappropriates the statute but also
restricts protection from workplace harassment to a select few who
happen to fall within a protected class.363 This expansion of Title VII
also encourages plaintiffs to claim they were harassed due to sexual
discrimination even when that bully may be victimizing both men
and women in the workplace.
Sexual harassment law is currently in flux and promises to grow
and change along with societal expectations. In its current state, cir-
cuit courts disagree about what constitutes sexual harassment and
what standard should be used to evaluate elements of sexual harass-
ment claims. The Supreme Court has yet to define clearly the bound-
aries of this area of law. In effect, Title VII has become a popular,
albeit sometimes inappropriate, basis for claims of general workplace
harassment. Courts and legislatures can create a more appropriate
remedy by preserving the doctrine of Title VII to include those cases
truly based on discrimination and providing an appropriate remedy
to all employees victimized by workplace bullying. Although no fed-
eral legislation to this end currently exists in the United States,364
the noticeable growing trend to litigate such cases indicates the need
for such legislation. A growing number of states have made efforts to
pass policies and laws forbidding bullies from harassing workers in
an attempt to compensate for the inadequate legal protections.365 As
legislatures move toward establishing laws prohibiting general work-
cant percent of employees will experience health-endangering workplace abuse.... In
addition to harming the target of such abuse, this behavior also has consequences for
employers .... Id.
362. WBI REPORT, supra note 8, at 4.
363. Id.
364. Targeting Workplace Bullies, supra note 349.
365. Bauza, supra note 237.
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place harassment, courts must preserve the law in its current state,
limiting the reach of Title VII harassment claims to those that stem
from discrimination. By endeavoring to preserve the doctrine of
sexual harassment law, while recognizing the need to remedy the
majority of workplace harassment not covered by Title VII, courts
can promote workplace equality and simultaneously protect all vic-
tims of workplace harassment regardless of their subjective reactions
or status as a protected class.
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